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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) is a rapidly evolving
field. As it continues to create new applications in life, industry,
agriculture and infrastructure, new challenges surface with them.
The application of IoT networks range from medical devices
to industrial robots. Such application dynamics present several
new networking challenges. IoT networks are inherently hetero-
geneous in terms of device capabilities, data volume, velocity
and variety. This paper explores the possibility and effectiveness
of combining IoT with the original concepts of blockchain
technology in maintaining a verifiable ledger of polymorphic
transactions to enable secure communication between devices.
We present a practical implementation of a flexible blockchain
system as a lightweight attachment to IoT devices. This system
embeds a policy manager which defines and regulates the
permissions required for authorised transactions; only a single
device is permitted to amend this policy. We then demonstrate
this system inside a reference topology by simulating activity
between multiple homogeneous IoT devices communicating over
the blockchain. We include devices of varying capabilities to
demonstrate how those with more resources can support the
chain whilst weaker devices consume from it.
Index Terms—blockchain, IoT, edge, lightweight, permission
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a paramount consideration in any networking
environment, exposing low-power devices on the open internet
is an inherent and widely researched vulnerability in IoT given
their generally weaker nature. If blockchain technology was to
power an IoT network, devices within can confidently rely on
it for data exchange in every transaction.
A. Short Background on Blockchains
Blockchains were introduced as a way of maintaining a
distributed database of all transactions grouped in blocks.
When signed, these blocks are published to the network
and become publicly traceable. The explicit reference to the
hash of the predecessor block forms the ancestral chain. In
cryptocurrencies, the block hashes serve as guarantors of own-
ership and authenticity as the block contents comprise part of
the input toward computing the hash. To successfully tamper
with an already-decided block, an adversary must re-compute
all successor blocks whilst continuing the present chain with
new transactions, which becomes more difficult as the audit
trail continues to grow. Any fraudulent chain must then be
submitted to, and accepted by, the majority of peers among a
decentralised network, which is unlikely without the adversary
controlling the majority of the network. Obtaining this proof
of work (PoW), a piece of data traditionally designed as
expensive to produce yet simple to verify, is known as mining.
With traditional blockchains, the PoW is computed by finding
a nonce which, when paired with properties and containing
transactions of the block, produce a signature (or hash) in a
format stipulated by the blockchain.
However, a traditional blockchain implementation would
be unsuitable in the context of IoT, as working inside tight
resource constraints is a core characteristic of IoT develop-
ment. Embedded devices are often low in processing power
and storage capacity, and are therefore unlikely to cope with
sustaining the blockchain and its above characteristics as well
as delivering their original purpose unimpaired. This requires
designing a lightweight blockchain with mechanics reworked
to suit an IoT environment.
B. Related Work
A review of previous studies addressing the security chal-
lenges found in IoT applications has shown a shared concern
for privacy and traceability. A recent study by Hewlett Packard
[1] found 70% of IoT devices to be vulnerable to attack,
citing privacy protection and weak authorisation as significant
contributing factors. The principles of blockchain technology
can address these. The work of Zheng et al. [2] discusses
the sensitive nature and volume of data IoT devices produce
ushers a need for protection and governance should they
malfunction or become compromised. Adireddy, Gottapu, and
Aravamudhan note in [3] that the multiplicity of IoT devices
Fig. 1. High level overview of participants, including a cluster head (bottom
right).
on a network along with their reduced capabilities adds to
their vulnerable nature and offer a solution based on public
key infrastructure.
Others have proposed integrating blockchain concepts with
IoT, such as Zhang et al. [4], who found the strong intercon-
nection of IoT networks leaves them vulnerable to adversaries
deploying malicious systems into the network and are easily
compromised, demonstrating the need for access control. They
propose a system leveraging smart contracts to regulate ac-
cess control, with blockchain supporting a distributed ledger
of the contracts. Danzi et al. [5] explore the feasibility of
integrating blockchain distributed ledger technologies (DLTs)
within a wireless network, finding DLT an effective guarantor
of information but at significantly higher network traffic. These
tudies are only relevant to this article and by no means this
is exhaustive of the list of the related work on DLT. Readers
interested in DLT are directed to [6] and references therein.
II. METHODOLOGY
This section presents the design of the proposed system
and includes the changes made to traditional blockchain tech-
nology to accommodate for IoT devices and the nature of
their environment. The system is designed as a lightweight,
software-based attachment connected over a standard P2P
network.
Although a public chain, only authorised participants, who
must exist on the policy, may receive from and submit to
the chain. Extremely low power devices unable to participate
in the chain may rely on direction from a cluster gateway
outfitted with the system described in this paper, as illustrated
in the bottom right of Fig. 1, wherein an array of low-power
sensors are under the management of a more robust gateway
capable of participating in the blockchain. When another
device requests a reading from a subordinate device with
appropriate authorisation, the cluster head receives this request
and probes accordingly. The cluster head then propagates the
reading on to the network from its subordinate device.
There is the possibility a weaker device under a cluster
head can become compromised, feeding malicious data un-
beknownst to the cluster head. A node must therefore be
able to suspect a breach and verify the integrity of another.
For the procedure, we recommend inspection of existing
Fig. 2. Pathway of the request process on an IoT device.
patterns such as challenge-response attestation; whereby a
challenger requests a memory checksum be computed ad hoc
by the prover, using a nonce, similar to the PoW found in
blockchains, to prevent pre-computed or masqueraded attacks.
This technique is adaptable to an IoT application, as seen in
the work of Krauß, Stumpf, and Eckert in [7], who extend
the process to include neighbours in peer policing through
behaviour analysis, which, in this context, would be processed
by a more capable node (in this application, the cluster head).
Unlike traditional implementations, this proposed
blockchain stipulates no additional requirements from
miners in hash computation or PoW. There is no expected
composition for hashes, such as involving nonce tokens as
with cryptocurrency blockchains. Members of the block and
its transactions within are submitted whole as input to a
SHA-2 function with a 256 bit digest. There is no economic
incentive offered to miners for throttling the block production
rate as this would only apply undue exertion on participants.
However, with no transaction fees, devices cannot mark
the importance of their transaction as with cryptocurrency
blockchains, where miners prioritise confirmation of those
offering a higher processing fee [8].
A. Device Integration
All devices rely on the same proposed system for requests as
illustrated in Fig. 2, which serves as an intermediary between
the network and the device itself. Devices connect to the
network and receive their commands from the blockchain in
an event-based fashion through callbacks. Authorised device
transactions are relayed through an event for the device to
process. Fig. 2 illustrates this flow through the direction of
arrows and system boundary lines, showing the process from
a received request passing through the local blockchain system
and, if authorised, on to the device itself. Administrative trans-
actions, however, are executed directly within the blockchain.
When a participant device is booted, it first attempts to load
the cached blockchain from disk into memory if it exists,
verify its integrity and connect to peers to synchronise and
reconcile any changes (e.g., policy amendments) from the
latest chain which took place during since going offline.
B. Storage
Space complexity is a significant constraint of blockchain,
particularly when considering an IoT application. Devices with
limited disk space are automatically ineligible as network par-
ticipants; the linear sequencing of blockchain [9] will require
some onboard storage volume - often scarce or absent entirely
in IoT devices. How a participant manages its memory and
storage does not affect the mechanics of the overall network.
For example, we can reduce the burden on weaker devices by
serialising the blocks into files of a suitable data-interchange
format, named by their sealing hash for ease of access, and
maintaining an in-memory, ordered list of the block hashes
instead.
Devices on the network are not required to mine or archive
the chain themselves if their processing power is limited; they
may still observe and submit transactions but are unable to
author blocks as they do not possess a full local copy of
the chain required to verify continuity; devices which do are
known as full nodes [10]. A full node with expansive storage
can serve as dedicated archivist of the chain’s ancestry. It is
recommended to maintain at least one sibling copy of the chain
as measures of both backup and protection, should a node
become compromised and attempt to tamper with the chain.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
This section presents a novel software-based prototype of
the proposed system, demonstrating how the characteristics of
such a system would translate into software. The source code
of this project is made available under a public repository1.
Derivatives, improvements, and pull requests are welcomed.
A. Formulation
The blockchain offers two constructors for initialisation.
The first accepts a parameter for an administrator profile iden-
tifier, used when formulating the blockchain as the first device
on a new network. The second accepts a block vector, which
is submitted to the local blockchain to verify and synchronise,
used when joining an existing network. It is during this stage
the policy is reconstructed and the former constructor is called,
declaring the administrator recorded in the genesis transaction.
As the synchronisation process can increase disk and memory
activity, it is only once—during device boot. Any capable
device may implement this protocol, but only the administrator
may introduce it to the network by amending the policy. Partic-
ipants of the blockchain may include appliances themselves,
dedicated miners, archivist servers or a management device
of a low-powered device cluster. The policy is maintained
in-memory for faster lookup. Amendments to the policy are
made through a distinct transaction type by the administrator
carrying only the changes for the relevant device.
B. Transactions
Devices receive instruction as output from the blockchain,
propagated via an appropriate callback. This design relieves
the device from the repetitive task of evaluating a transaction’s
authenticity and determining how to act. All rejected transac-
tions are propagated to an optional separate callback, which
more powerful devices may register to monitor for spikes in
1Repository available at: https://github.com/aco/iot-blockchain.
rejected transactions, possibly indicating a compromised de-
vice on the network, and alert the administrator. The callback
registrar does not require a corresponding entry for each type
of transaction and event, it is left entirely to the device to
register interest or share callback methods.
Algorithm 1 Authorising, storing, and executing a transaction.
procedure APPENDTRANSACTION(*transaction)
transactionType← typeid of transaction
if transaction.authorise(Policy) then
if transactionType administrative then
execute transaction passing Policy Manager
else
execute transaction passing nullptr
else
invoke rejectionCallback passing transaction
append transaction to getLeadBlock().transactions
if callbackRegistrar includes transactionType then
invoke callback passing transaction
else
invoke genericCallback passing transaction
if transaction.expedited then
seal leadBlock
else
invoke transactionBroadcastResponder
A device transaction is authorised when there is a corre-
sponding policy entry for the device specified by the trans-
action, and when the entry contains sufficient permission for
the transaction author, depending on the action (read or write).
The policy considers an absent entry for either key (resource
or profile) as unauthorised. Authorised transactions are offered
the policy header or propagated to the device for execution.
Transactions with absent, banned or unknown identities are
rejected and do not pass to the device (unless it specifically
registers a rejected transaction callback).
All transactions in this system derive from a base Trans-
action class. Each subclass of transaction implements the
virtual methods from the base to account for their additional
properties and individual purpose, in keeping with the Liskov
substitution principle. Transactions inherit an execute method,
allowing the blockchain to delegate execution to the subclass
to the same benefit above. As a preventive measure, only ad-
ministrative transactions recognised as valid by the blockchain
are offered a pointer to the policy manager. This process is
denoted in Algorithm 1.
IV. CASE STUDY
To demonstrate this blockchain system, we describe in this
section a case study simulating a P2P network of devices
in the context of a domestic smart environment featuring
an administrative device, a lightbulb and a series of sensors
operating under a cluster. It should be noted there is no explicit
requirement for devices to follow the same standard in other
use cases of this system.
• Device: The base for all participating devices in this
environment. It includes a callback for transactions and
blocks, a unique identifier, and a live value. Standard
devices can author and broadcast transactions on the net-
work, but cannot mine or publish blocks. These devices
should register a callback for at least device transactions.
• ParticipantDevice: This form of device is assumed to be
more powerful than the base and is capable of mining and
publishing blocks on the network. It registers individual
callbacks for all forms of transaction. It is also able to
broadcast an entire block to the network.
• ClusterDevice: The cluster device subclasses from the
participant device and is assumed to have at least equal
computing power to its superclass. This device directs a
subset of individual devices (which do not maintain their
own copies of the blockchain) and registers an override
for authorised inter-device transactions.
The device inheritance structure described above is solely
for the demonstration of this framework, devices of any nature
may implement any portion(s). The only requirement is a
callback for authorised device transactions. To simplify the
network simulation, devices inherit from the Blockchain class
to protect members from access by the network, in a hierarchy
to that of the policy manager.
A. Synthetic Network
For the simulation, we construct a network of four devices
based on the examples described in Section III, beginning with
a standard device for the administrator. In reality, this may be
a smartphone or tablet. Added to the network is a cluster head,
responsible for two sensors detecting gas and flame. Finally, a
standalone lightbulb is admitted to the network as a participant
device.
When all devices have joined the network, an external helper
method applies randomised permissions between random de-
vices to ensure the policy will reject some transactions in the
demonstration. All devices are permitted read access to the
sensors within the cluster head of the network. Subordinates
of the cluster are treated equally to peers, and each must have
some entry in the policy header.
B. Performance
The practical implementation of this framework is written
in C++17 for its efficiency and easier integration into testbed
IoT hardware. The source was written under the C++ standard
library with one external dependency, a header-only SHA-
256 generator, used in hashing transactions and blocks. In
simulation, using a 2015 MacBook Pro 2.2 GHz Intel Core
i7 with 16 GB memory, the framework demonstrates high
performance with an average processing rate of 45 unique,
inter-device transactions per millisecond.
The majority of read operations on the framework run in
O(1) constant time, owing to extensive mapping of objects
into sorted associative containers. As an example, the policy
manager is implemented as a nested hash map for devices
and their associated permissions for other devices on the
network. Similarly, the majority of vector operations (such
as appending transactions to a block) are run in amortized
constant time. As with traditional blockchains, traversing the
chain in-memory is only completed in O(n) linear time as
blocks are indexed numerically and not by hash. Indeed, O(1)
lookup is a possibility should a device opt to store blocks on
disk, but the framework does not enforce such behaviour.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes an approach to integrating both
user and device actions and permission control in a single
blockchain as a medium of communication. We begin with
the core characteristics of blockchain technology, such PoW
consensus, heaviest-chain favouring, transaction grouping and
peer cooperation. Then, we refine for an IoT environment by
eliminating economic incentives, such as rewarded mining, and
introducing polymorphic transactions for communication. Not
only can device access be regulated at a granular level, but its
communications take place over the same protocol, leveraging
the authentication already provided for in the permission
system.
This system is generic enough to be extensible for other
IoT-related use cases. In this prototype, the use of template
functions and polymorphism requires little maintenance be-
sides creating a new class of transaction. Devices may register
a callback to the new transaction type in an identical fashion
to existing types.
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